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1. INTRODUCTION 
There are several reasons why a brief investigation into the question 
whether or not the Constitution allows us the right to die is so 
important. The South African Law Commission has issued a Discussion 
Paper on Euthanasia and the Artificial Preservation of Life. 1 This paper 
might bring long awaited law reform and certainty. 
Advances in medicine and technology have reached such a stage that 
death can become a long process. Sometimes a patient can be kept 
artificially alive for years in a hospital at a very high cost which may not 
be justifiable where such a patient has no hope of either improving or 
recovering. Palliative care measures have also improved and are 
constantly being viewed as options to allowing a person the right to die. 
In South Africa the introduction of a paramount constitution with an 
entrenched Bill of Rights2 has also brought about a shift in philosophy. 
We now put more emphasis on a person's right to self-determination, 
autonomy privacy etc. where decisions have to be made about the 
individual's life, health and welfare. 
There has also been an increased concern for the rights of the dying. 
People are now dying mostly from chronic degenerative diseases which 
occur later in life. This means that more old people are dying in nursing 
1 Discussion Paper 71, Project 86. 
2 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108of1996. 
1 
homes and hospitals which trend has increased the loneliness of 
patients and their estrangement from familiar surroundings. 3 
This study aims to show that terminally ill patients who are in 
unbearable pain should be allowed to end their life in a peaceful, 
painless and dignified manner where there are no prospects of 
improvement and/or recovery. The study also aims to show that the 
practice of active, voluntary euthanasia should be allowed for these 
patients. Once this right is acknowledged, ways of realising it must also 
be determined. 
Therefore this study will be confined to : 
-Terminally ill competent patients who are in pain. These 
patients do not want to linger on in pain, but want to die. In 
fact the patients will be asking for death because they know 
that the end of their life is near and certain, all that they 
want is to end their life on their own terms. 
- Mentally incompetent patients for whom there is no 
prognosis of improvement or recovery whatsoever. These 
patients might have expressed a wish either in writing or 
orally that should they be in this condition, they would like 
to end their life. 
3 B G Ranchod 11 Another Legal View of Euthanasia 11 in Euthanasia ed Oosthuizen 
et al, 133. 
2 
2. EXPLANATION OF TERMS 
A definition of some of the terms that will be frequently referred to is 
necessary and as follows:-
Euthanasia 
The act of killing someone painlessly, with a view to relieve suffering 
from an incurable illness4 • Euthanasia is synonymous with mercy killing, 
the latter phrase being the one commonly used. Here we are dealing 
with intense physical pain and not emotional distress. 
Voluntary Active euthanasia5 
A positive act whereby someone's life is ended with the aim of sparing 
them pain or to end a meaningless existence. Usually a terminally ill 
patient will request the termination of his or her life because of being 
in her extreme pain and someone else will administer a lethal procedure. 
Voluntary Passive euthanasia 
The removal of life sustaining apparatus at the patient's request. With 
passive euthanasia we are dealing with the discontinuation of treatment 
or the cessation of life-prolonging treatment. 
Non-Voluntary Passive euthanasia 
The removal of life sustaining apparatus without the patient requesting 
this. This is where the patient's doctor (usually after consulting some 
coJleagues) or family members decide that embarking on treatment or 
4 Labuschagne JMT, "Dekriminalisasie van Eutanasie" 1988 (51) THRHR 178,. My 
translation : Vir doeleindes van die verdere bespreking kan eutanasie omskryf word 
as die opsetlike dood van 'n medemens met die doel om lyding of 'n sinlose lewe 
te beeindig. 
5 Ibid, my own translation. 
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continuing with some form of treatment will be fruitless. Usually 
palliative care is administered until the patient dies. 
Non-Voluntary Active euthanasia 
The termination of a terminally ill patient's life, without the latter 
requesting such termination, by another. Usually this is done by a 
person close to the patient out of compassion. 
3. IS THERE A RIGHT TO DIE? 
3. 1. South African Law Before the 1996 Constitution 
Nowhere in the common law is there toleration for ending the life of 
another human being with the aim of alleviating their pain and suffering. 
The state of South African law regarding euthanasia before 1 996 can 
be summarised as follows 6 :-
(a) Mercy killing by means of an act of commission constitutes the 
crime of murder, and acts of commission would include the 
withdrawal of medical aid by means of a positive action, such as 
disconnecting a machine. 
(b) Where mercy-killing is administered passively, that is, by simply 
withholding treatment that could prolong the patient's life, 
criminal responsibility can, in the appropriate circumstances be 
founded upon either the protective relationship assumed by a 
6 Oosthuizen et al, Euthanasia, 119. 
4 
doctor towards his patient, or the prior conduct of the doctor 
evidenced by initial medical treatment that would increase the 
likelihood of death, that the particular treatment were to be 
discontinued. 
(c) In all instances, consent on the part of the deceased is no excuse, 
though it may, as an extenuating circumstance, have a bearing on 
the sentence imposed by the court. 
Although suicide and attempted suicide are no longer crimes, 
assisting someone to commit suicide remains a punishable 
offence. In general the situation in South African law is not at all 
clear. Persons concerned with euthanasia in all its forms, viz 
doctors, remain in the dark about what is legally permissible. 
3. 2. The Right to Die and the Constitution 
In a recent decision7, a living will was accepted by the court. The court 
continued to grant authorization to the wife of a patient in a vegetative 
state to cease artificial feeding, which was keeping the patient alive. 
This instance is an example of the already acceptable passive 
euthanasia. It is nevertheless important in that it accepted the notion of 
quality of life, rather than mere existence. More importantly it 
recognised that the prior expressed consent of the patient must be 
respected. 
7 Clarke v Hurst NO 1992 (2) SA 630 (D) 
5 
In most instances regarding active euthanasia 8 , although the acts were 
found to be unlawful, the sentences were lenient. 
It has to a large extent been accepted by the legal, medical and moral 
communities that life-prolonging treatment may be discontinued if it 
becomes apparent that there is no hope for the recovery and/or 
improvement of the patient. Recovery should not be defined simply as 
the ability to remain 'alive', it should also mean life without intolerable 
suffering. 
Continuation of life by artificial means in instances where the patient is 
terminally ill or dying is not only traumatic to the patients but to their 
next of kin. In instances such as these, the patient and/or his next of 
kin will not only be faced with emotional distress but also with financial 
difficulties. Modern medicine is equipped with all sorts of gadgets that 
could keep a dying person alive for ages. It is a reality that most 
families will be faced with enormous medical bills for sustaining a life 
whose quality is non-existent. It may seen heartless to be thinking 
about finances when the care of a loved one is at stake but most of 
these life prolonging treatments are too expensive and may spell 
financial disaster for the average family. 9 
8 S v De Bellocq 1975 (3) .SA 538 (T), S v Hartmann 1975 (3) SA 533 (T). 
9 
"A right to die?", Bhagaloo K, \VUSLR 83-84. 
6 
It may be true that in the past people were opposed to euthanasia, 
either active or passive, but now dying patients are becoming slaves of 
the medical profession. In the interests of science they seek to see how 
long they can keep a body alive. In the past even though euthanasia 
was opposed the period that medicine could prolong the life of such a 
patient was also limited. 
Christiaan Barnard, the famous heart surgeon contends that life should 
be allowed to continue only when it is enjoyable: 10 
'Why should modern medicine try to prolong the process of life 
when it can no longer be enjoyed? In fact we are no longer 
prolonging the process of life, in this way we are actually 
prolonging death.' 
Van der Vyver believes that every man has what he terms a 'sacred 
right' to die peacefully and with dignity and that a person who is ready 
to do so, should be allowed to meet his God. 11 
The South African Constitution 12 with its entrenched bill of rights lends 
a number of rights and freedoms to the individual. 
Lite 
S 11 provides that 
'Everyone has the right to life' 
10 Strauss,Doctor, patient and the law, 337. 
11 Ibid. 
12Act 108of1996. 
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It is true that everyone has a right to life, but this almost begs the 
question: "What is life?". Of course this is a philosophical question but 
it does depend on a few practical issues. The presence of a heart beat 
is no longer a sufficient criterion to evaluate life. For terminally ill 
patients in pain and those in a persistent vegetative state, the quality 
of life that they have or might have in future should be a consideration. 
Death is, for each of us, among the most significant events of life. As 
the Chief Justice of the USA said in Cruzan v Missouri13 "the choice 
between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and 
overwhelming finality". Most of us see death - whatever we think will 
follow it - as the final act of life's drama, and we want that last act to 
reflect our convictions, those we have tried to live by not the 
convictions of others forced on us in our most vulnerable moment. 
"Different people, of different religious and ethical beliefs, 
embrace very different convictions about which way of dying 
confirms and which contradicts the value of their lives. Some 
fight against death with every weapon their doctors can devise. 
Others will do nothing to hasten death even if they pray it will 
come soon. Still others, want to end their lives when they think 
that living on, in the only way they can, would disfigure rather 
than enhance the lives they had created. Even if it were possible 
to eliminate all pain for a dying patient - and frequently that is not 
possible - that would not end or even much alleviate the anguish 
some would feel at remaining alive, but intubated, helpless, and 
often sedated near oblivion.' 14 
13 497 us 261, 281 (1990). 
14 Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon 
and Judith Sarvis Thomson. assisted Suicide: The Philosopher's Brief, The New 
8 
Man must be entitled to demand the release of death from hopeless and 
helpless pain, and a physician who gives this release is entitled to moral 
and legal absolution for his act. 15 
We must start recognising that the quality of life matters because 
absolute interdiction of euthanasia involves the impossible assertion 
that every life, no matter what its quality or circumstances, is worth 
living and obligatory to be lived. On any rationally acceptable philosophy 
there is no ethical value in living any sort of life : the only life that is 
worth living is the good life. Sidney Hook, after quoting Aristotle to this 
effect, continued: · 
"We may define the good life differently, but no matter what our 
conception of the good life is, it presupposes a physical basis - a 
certain indispensable minimum of physical and social well-being -
necessary for even a limited realization of that good life. Where 
that minimum is failing together with all rational probability of 
attaining it, to avoid a life that at its best can be only vegetative 
and at its worst run the entire gamut of degradation and obloquy, 
what high-minded person would refuse the call of the 'moet 
mourir entre Jes bras du sommeil'? We must recognise no 
categorical imperative 'to live', but 'to live well."' 16 
In S v Makwanyane & Another17 it was decided that the core of 'the 
York Review March 27, 1997. 
15 Glanville Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, 277. 
16 Chapter 2, The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1996. 
17 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
9 
right to life' is the right not to be put to death by the state. Should the 
quality of life be read into the ambit of section 9 it will broaden it. This 
is possible as in Clarke v Hurst NO, 18 Judge Thirion did refer to the 
quality of life although he was concerned with the artificial maintenance 
of life. The court found that: 
" The maintenance of life in the form of certain biological 
functions such as the heartbeat, respiration, digestion and blood 
circulation but unaccompanied by any cortical and cerebral 
functioning of the brain, cannot be equated with living in the 
human context. If then the resuscitative measures were 
successful in restoring only these biological functions then they 
were in reality unsuccessful and consequently artificial measures 
of maintaining that level of life, such as naso-gastric feeding, 
could also be discontinued." 
This is an instance where the court was willing to consider the quality 
of life. 
This section has to be read 1n conjunction with the right to human 
dignity and privacy. 
Human Dignity 
S 1 0 provides that 
'Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected' 
The right to human dignity has been described as the most important 
of all human rights alongside the right to life. 19 This right also forms the 
foundation of many other rights. In fact human dignity is the founding 
18 658 B-E. 
19 S v Makwanyane supra, 144. 
10 
value of the 1996 Constitution. 
There are certain illnesses e.g. failure to control one's bowels that not 
only keep a patient in constant pain but also erode their dignity. 
Terminally ill patients who are certain that death is near and are in pain 
are often given quantities of pain-killers or sedatives that make the pain 
bearable. The effect of this practice is that the patients will often be 
kept in a semi-conscious state because if they are fully aware they will 
not be able to stand the pain. So they start to slip into an area of dying 
slowly. 
This is where medical technology effectively creates the so-called 
'twilight zone' of suspended animation where death commences while 
life in some form, continues. 
Medical professionals in this instance know that should they give the 
patient the correct dose to alleviate the pain altogether it will most 
certainly end up killing the patient which could be regarded as a form 
of euthanasia. It is however a moral duty that we, as humans have to 
relieve pain. 
The above scenario is known as the 'double effect' principle where it all 
depends on the intention of the medi.cal practitioner. As H JJ Leenen 
had observed20, the doctor's aim in this situation is not to terminate life, 
but to alleviate the patient's suffering: 
20 Strauss, op cit 346. 
11 
"The administration of the pain-alleviating method can be qualified 
as an act with double-effect. It must not be defined according to 
its side effect, the unavoidable shortening of life, but according to 
its aim, which is to combat the pain of which the patient is 
suffering. Many medical acts and drugs have side effects, but 
nobody will define them from the viewpoint of these side-effects. 
The same is true for pain killing." 
Therefore if the doctor's intention was to relieve pain and not to cause 
death, but death did occur as a secondary effect, there will be no 
question of criminal or civil liability on his part. 
Judging by the instances that have come before our courts on this 
issue, a great deal of compassion was elicited for the accused. 
Although they were all found guilty, the sentences that were meted out 
show the understanding that our courts have of what terminally ill 
patients in pain and their families go through, even where the accused's 
primary intention was to cause death. As Strauss puts it, we have a 
criminal "non law" which no one wants to enforce. 21 
We all want to live as long as we can, but pain and suffering can 
diminish our dignity to such an extent that the desire to live diminishes 
altogether. What this patient will be asking for is to die in a manner that 
keeps their dignity intact. People worry about their dignity when they 
are defamed or insulted and yet that has nothing to do with their 
. 
physical being and yet we are willing to deny a dying person, his last 
wish to die in dignity and are almost driving him to commit suicide. 
21 Op cit 342. 
12 
Why do we deny him the relief of a humane exit? Because we value the 
quantity of life more than the quality of life to such an extent that we 
are willing to force a person to live in pain because we could not live 
with ourselves if we allowed them to die? That does not sound humane 
at all. We put down animals in pain or those without anyone to look 
after them, yet we do not show the same consideration and 
compassion for people. 
The constitutional birth and survival of this proposed right to die will 
depend on whether the legislation proposed by amongst others the 
South African Law Commission22 is given favourable interpretation by 
the constitutional court. 
"The Constitutional Court has to give 'life" a content value so that 
some form of quality of life beyond mechanical existence is read 
into the right to life, so that where quality is not in existence, a 
limitation to the right to life guarantee will be acceptable. The 
continuation of a life whose quality has degenerated to such a 
degree that to prolong the dying process runs counter to the right 
to life guarantee. 
The right of a terminally ill patient to dignity, self determination 
and privacy embodies the values of an open and democratic 
society which would justify limitation of the right to life in 
circumstances where a person is little more than alive. " 23 
The right to privacy at its minimum, ensures that certain aspects of an 
individual's life remain free from interference by the state. Since the 
22 SALC Project 86, Euthanasia and the Artificial Preservation of Life. 
23Chaskalson et al, Constitutional Law of South Mrica 15 - 8. 
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Second World War and the atrocities committed by the Nazis, there has 
been more emphasis on human autonomy, 24 and the right to privacy 
ensures that important decisions about one's life are free from state 
interference. 
4. POSSIBLE SUBJECT OF THE RIGHT TO DIE 
Like any other right, the right to demand assistance to end one's life is 
not absolute. This right will be limited to the terminally ill patients : both 
competent and incompetent. These are persons who cannot do 
anything to alter their circumstances, for them the next certain event 
in their life is death. It is true that every competent person can decide 
whether or not to continue living but not all these people can claim to 
be assisted with their death. 
This study therefore excludes the so-called ordinary suicides25 . For 
these persons granting them death will be denying them a chance to go 
through all the aspects of life, because emotional distress and pain that 
can ultimately be overcome are part of life. These persons will still 
continue to take their lives. However they cannot be legally assisted to 
do so. 
Therefore the possible subjects of the right to die will be : 
24General Assembly Resolution 3103 (XXVIl), 1973. 
25 Eg emotionally troubled people. 
14 
4.1. The Terminally Ill and Competent Patient 
Ellen Bartlett relates how her mother, Martha who had suffered two 
massive cerebral haemorrhages in January and February 1 984 finally 
died in 198726 • Since 1984 she had been in constant pain. She was 
diagnosed with thalamic pain syndrome. This syndrome is rare in stroke 
survivors because it results from the kind of brain injury that few 
survive. Physicians know little about it. It is unpredictable, 
indescribable, incurable and likely to worsen over time. An array of pain 
killers and anti-depressants taken in ever-increasing doses could take 
the pain to a more indistinct level, but never take it away. 
She had tried to kill herself in several ways, throwing herself down a 
flight of stairs, wearing a plastic bag over her head and taking an 
overdose of pills several times. The family had also discussed 
administering cyanide to her at one stage. She finally did manage to kill 
herself and of that death Ellen writes : 
"I do not regret her death. My regret is that I was not there for it, 
to tell her I loved her, to kiss her goodbye, to be with her when 
she died. Had there been less stigma attached to the unnatural 
means of dying, perhaps she would have invited us to be with 
her. But she chose to go alone, in her time, when she was ready. 
She had lost so much of herself in the past three years that only 
by doing what she had done, she had got some of herself back. 
By ending her life, she had taken control of it, had made herself 
whole again." 
What forced Ellen's mother to resort to the kind of measures that she 
did is the prevailing laws against ative euthanasia in South Africa. In our 
267he day my mother took her own life,' Mail & Guardian April to May 1 1997, 12. 
15 
law a terminally ill person who requests the termination of his/her life 
due to experiencing unbearable pain cannot be assisted. Should you 
assist, then you will be charged and convicted with murder. 
Consent on the part of the deceased is no excuse, though it may, as an 
extenuating circumstance, have a bearing on the sentence imposed by 
the court. As Van Winsen J so concisely stated in the case of S v 
Hartmann27 : 
" ... the fact that the deceased wished to be killed does not 
exclude the criminal responsibility of him who gratifies the 
deceased' s wish". 
It is accordingly beyond the power of an individual to consent , for 
whatever reason, to be killed. 28 
4. 1 . 1 Comparative Survey 
In most countries aiding, abetting and assisting suicide is punishable by 
law. 
Section 241 of the Canadian Penal Code states that: 
Everyone who 
a. counsels a person to commit suicide or 
b. aids or abets a person to commit suicide whether suicide 
ensues or not, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years. 
In the United States, the constant prosecution of Dr Kervokian shows 
271975 3 SA 532 C at 534. 
28R v Peverett 1940 AD 213, S v Robinson & Others 1968 (1) SA 666 (A) at 678. 
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that voluntary active euthanasia is not allowed and that the person 
assisting will be punished by law. On 26 June 1 997 the American 
Supreme Court handed down its long-awaited judgement on the legality 
of physician assisted suicide in the USA, in the case of Washington et 
al v Glucksberg et al. In its judgement the court unanimously declared 
that a 1 994 Washington State law, which declared assistance to a 
person who attempts suicide a criminal offence, is not unconstitutional. 
The court regarded assisting suicide as inconsistent with American 
philosophical, legal and cultural values. 29 
The attempt by the legislature of the Northern Territory of Australia to 
legalise voluntary active euthanasia in terms of the Rights of the 
Terminally Ill Act in 199630 drew world-wide attention. This Act 
provided for both active voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in 
that it provided that a patient who, in the course of terminal illness, is 
experiencing pain, suffering or distress to an unacceptable extent may 
request his or her medical practitioner to assist in terminating his or her 
life. The Australian Medical Association welcomed this new 
development but the federal government overturned it because they do 
have the powers to veto the laws in the state and territories. 
The Netherlands31 so far seems to be the one country where physician 
29 Straus SA, "US Supreme Court rules prohibition of assisted suicide to be 
constitutionally valid." Article distributed to Medical Jurisprudence students at 
UNISA. 
30 Pretoria News, 7 January 1997, at 7. 
31Holland's use and abuse of death, Mail & Guardian, Feb 21 to 271997, at 8. 
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assisted suicide is for all practical purposes legal. Section 293 of the 
Dutch Criminal Code read with section 294 states that: 
S293 
S294 
Hij die een of ander op zijn uitdrukkelijk en erstig velangen van het 
leven berooft wordt gestraft met gevangenisstraf van hoogstens 
twaalf jaren: 
Hij die opzetlijk een ander tot zelfmoord aanzet, hem daarbij 
behulpzaam is of hem de middelen daartoe verschaft, wordt, 
indien de zelfmoord volgt gestraft met gevangenisstraf van ten 
hoogste drie jaren of geld boete van de vierde kategorie. 
Although these sections exist a physician who assists a mentally 
competent adult to commit suicide can escape criminal liability if he 
pleads overmacht in the form of necessity. Since then, the Netherlands 
have refined their voluntary active euthanasia laws to such an extent 
that the practice can be monitored objectively. 
4.2 The Terminally Ill and Incompetent Patient 
Mentally incompetent patients usually find themselves in a persistent 
vegetative state which is a condition most often caused by brain injury 
or asphyxiation where the oxygen supply to the brain is shut off for an 
extensive period of time thereby resulting in irreversible brain damage. 
These patients will never be conscious, they are being kept alive by 
18 
artificial means. One or more of their basic bodily function(s) 32 is being 
performed by someone or something else. 
For this patient we are concerned with life-sustaining medical 
treatment. Sometimes the patient might have left an advance directive, 
either written or oral, that should he be in this condition, they would 
prefer that his family ask/request that the life-sustaining treatment be 
stopped. At other times this directive might be absent. 
4.2.1. Where There is An Advance Directive - Current SA Law 
It is an acceptable principle in our law that a mentally competent person 
is entitled to refuse medical treatment, even where such treatment is 
life-sustaining. 33 With an advance directive (living will) the competent 
person tries to issue advance directives to people who will be in charge 
of his medical treatment when he is no longer in a position to make 
such decisions. 
Professor Strauss defines a 'Living Will' as follows34 : 
"Legally it is a declaration in which a person in anticipando by 
way of an advance directive refuses medical attention in the form 
of being kept alive by artificial means." 
There is no judgment in our case law where the issue of advance 
32Breathing, feeding, etc. 
33Phillips v De Klerk March 1983 TPD (unreported) . 
. 
34Strauss, Doctor. Patient and the Law 3rd Edition, 344. 
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directives has been discussed thoroughly. However in Clarke v Hurst 
NQ35 it was stated that effect should be given to a patient's wishes as 
expressed when he was in good health. Although the court's decision 
was guided by the convictions of the community as interpreted by the 
court, the patient's wishes as provided in the 'Living Will' were referred 
to36 : 
11 It is indeed difficult to appreciate a situation, save where a 
patient is suffering unbearable pain or is in a vegetative state, 
where it would be in the best interests not to exist at all. The 
patient in the present case has, however, passed beyond the point 
where he could be said to have an interest in the matter. But just 
as a living person has an interest in the disposal of his body, so I 
think the patient's wishes as expressed when he was in good 
health should be given effect. 11 
4. 2. 1 .A. Comparative Survey 
In the United Kingdom, a patient of sound mind can also refuse any 
medical treatment. The validity of advance directives has not been 
expressly tested by the courts and there is no legislation in this area. 
The usefulness of such a document is acknowledged by writers but the 
courts will still have to determine to what an extent they would 
recognise such a document. 
In Airedale NHS Trust v Bland37 the court did on several occasions refer 
positively to the usefulness of such a document. Lord Goff expressed 
351992 4 SA 630 (D). 
36 Strauss, Doctor. Patient and the Law 3ed, 344. 
37 [1993] 1 ALL ER 821. 
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that a patient's right to refuse treatment can be extended to an 
incompetent patient, who expressed his wishes to refuse treatment at 
an earlier stage. 
At this stage there is no legal certainty on the issue. Legislation 1s 
necessary. 
In the USA since 1976, most states have accepted legislation governing 
advance directives, where refusal of medical treatment is concerned. 
Although in all states the document must be written, there are variation 
as to further validity requirements in different states. Some states have 
also made provision for enduring powers of attorney, in terms of which 
decisions can be made on behalf of incompetent patients in respect of 
their medical treatment. 38 
In Australia the question regarding the refusal of consent to medical 
treatment and the artificial support of life is dealt with differently in 
different states. Firstly, some states such as South Australia and the 
Northern Territory give effect to the advance directive (living will) by 
way of legislation. 39 Secondly, some states such as Victoria and 
Western Australia make use of substituted decision-making by an agent 
appointed according to an enduring power of attorney or a curator 
appointed by the court. 40 
38 SALC, Discussion Paper 71. 
39 SALC, Discussion Paper 71. 
40 Ibid. 
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4.2.2. Where There is no Advance Directive - Current SA Law 
The legal position in our law is best reflected by the courts in S v De 
Bellocq41 where the accused, a young married woman had given birth 
to a premature baby who was suffering from a mental illness which 
would have prevented him from ever leading a normal life. The accused 
had drowned the baby. In finding her guilty the court per De Wet J P 
stated: 
"The law does not allow any person to be killed whether that 
person is an imbecile or very ill. The killing of such a person is an 
unlawful act and it amounts to murder in law42 ." 
4.2.2.A. Comparative Survey 
The United States' first instance was that of Karen Quinlan in 197643 • 
In 1975 after Karen had been in a vegetative state for seven months, 
her father applied to court to have her respirator disconnected. In 
granting the order, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on her 
constitutional rights to privacy and self-determination. 
Then in 1990 the Supreme Court of the United States was approached 
41 Supra. 
42 Supra. 
43 In re Quinlan 70/81NJ10, 355 A 2d 647(NJ1976). 
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by Joyce and Joe Cruzan, 44 the parents of Nancy Cruzan aged 32, for 
an order granting them permission to end their daughter's life. Nancy 
had for the past seven years lain awake but unaware after a car crash. 
Unlike Karen Quinlan, Nancy was not on a life-support system, she was 
in a persistent vegetative state. Her parents were asking the court to 
remove a feeding tube so that she could starve to death. 
The Supreme Court did acknowledge Nancy's right to refuse treatment, 
but would not affirm substituted refusal by family members without 
clear and convincing evidence that what the family was asking for was 
in line with what the patient had wanted. 
In the United Kingdom cessation of life-prolonging treatment was dealt 
with in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland45 . Anthony Bland, 21 had been in a 
persistent vegetative state for over three years when the health 
authority applied for a declaratory order to the effect that his treatment 
should be discontinued and that the only medical treatment that should 
be furnished should be aimed at enabling him to die peacefully with 
dignity and no pain and that no criminal liability would arise on the part 
of the applicant. He had a feeding tube and was being assisted in other 
bodily functions but his brain had no cognitive functions. 
The judge granted the order and it was affirmed on appeal. The House 
44 Cruzan v Director Missouri Department of Health 497 US 261 (1990), 111 L Ed 
2d 224, 110 S Ct 2841.. 
45 Supra. 
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of Lords decided this instance with reference to the best interest 
condition as set out in F v West Berkshire Health Authority46 and held 
that medical treatment including artificial feeding may be withheld if it 
is in the patient's best interest not to be treated any further since such 
treatment is futile and does not confer any benefit on the patient. 
5. EUTHANASIA AS A FACTOR IN THE RIGHT TO DIE 
Now that the right to die has been established and a criterion for 
identifying the cases has been set, a humane method for the actual 
implementation of this right and a panel of competent persons who 
could make final decisions in this regard should be established. 
Euthanasia, which is described above as 'the act of killing someone 
painlessly, with a view to relieve suffering from an incurable illness' will 
be the proper route to take to realise the right to die. 
Whether it is supposed to be active or passive euthanasia will depend 
on the patients' circumstances. 
5. 1 Passive Euthanasia 
It has to a large extent been accepted by the legal, medical and moral 
communities that life-prolonging treatment may be discontinued if it 
becomes apparent that there is no hope for the recovery and/or 
improvement of the patient. Passive euthanasia therefore, involves the 
46 (1989] 2 ALL ER 545, (1990] 2 AC 1. 
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cessation of life-prolonging treatment. 
Passive euthanasia might be voluntary in that the competent patient 
might decide to refuse any life-prolonging treatment and the 
incompetent patient might have stated prior to becoming incompetent 
that in circumstances like these they would like to be allowed to die, or 
involuntary in that an incompetent patients doctor or duly appointed 
representative might decide that the life-prolonging treatment be 
ceased. 
5. 1 . 1 Arguments for passive euthanasia 
(a) Allowing a patient to die 
This is really the only argument for passive euthanasia and the situation 
is well summed up by Mason and McCall Smith47 : 
"We, by contrast believe that a morally significant difference 
between inactivity and action exists and that this rests on a firmer 
base than a mere intuition. The essence of discrimination lies in 
the means to obtain the same end, in that the taking of active 
steps implies an autocratic control over the way in which the 
event occurs. The doctor who administers a drug intended to end 
the life of a suffering patient determines the moment and the 
manner of the patient's death. The action of the drug changes the 
physical cause of death and this must be a matter of importance. 
The process is quite different from allowing another agency - e g 
illness - to cause death." 
We feel differently when we allow a patient to die than when we 
47Mason and McCall-Smith, Euthanasia in Law and Medical Ethics 1987, 233. 
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actively participate in bringing about the patient's death. While only a 
minuscule number of physicians would work actively to end the life of 
a patient, passive euthanasia is practised fairly widely. It is also 
accepted that there is a difference in intent between acts of 
commission and those of omission. This difference in intent becomes 
important in distinguishing between the rightness of an act and the 
worthiness of an act. 48 For example, if a doctor administers what is 
intended to be a life-saving drug but the recipient has an unusual 
reaction to it, the doctor will be said to have done the wrong thing but 
would not be blameworthy. This is because the doctor's intentions 
were good. Intention might be morally relevant in deciding whether the 
act was wrong as well as blameworthy. 
5.1.2 Arguments against passive euthanasia 
While passive euthanasia has gained general acceptance as part of good 
medical practice, it is clear that it will not gain moral acceptance in all 
its forms. 
fa) Failure to provide treatment 
"A failure on the part of a medical doctor to provide his patient 
with treatment thought to be appropriate in the circumstances 
might well be considered to be a morally culpable omission. " 49 
48Veatch, Death, Dying and the Biological Revolution 83-85. 
49 Mason and McCall-Smith, supra. 
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Therefore non-treatment of those with deteriorating health might be 
considered inappropriate. 
b) Who decides? 
Most instances concerning passive euthanasia deal with incompetent 
patients. Therefore it inevitably involves someone else taking the 
decision on behalf of the patient. This is almost always a family 
member or a person closest to the patient. It is they who are likely to 
know the patient's personal history, beliefs and wishes. The doctor may 
also know this if he/she has communicated with the patient previously 
on the issue. It is submitted that rarely, if ever, is a judge capable of 
making the decision. Despite his judicial wisdom he can never really 
know what the patient would have wanted. 50 
Sometimes it is the medical practitioner who makes an informed 
decision not to commence with medical treatment or to cease any 
medical treatment. 51 The concern here is: who supervises these medical 
practitioners. 
It is submitted that simple legislation that sets up a tribunal within the 
confines of the hospital and subject to review by a court of law will be 
50 Bhagaloo, A Right to Die, WUSLR 84. 
51 Those who favour passive euthanasia are , however, quick to point out that this 
situation can be remedied by accepting a statement made by the patient whilst 
still competent. In South Africa and in the United States the courts do put 
considerable value on the prior statements made by a patient but the degree of 
proof required is very high. A living will statute would certainly go a long way 
towards rectifying this concern. 
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the most efficient way of reaching a decision. In the implementation of 
euthanasia final decisions in this regard will have to be taken rapidly, 
responsibly, reliably and with the prospect of review. 52 
5. 2 Active Euthanasia 
The scope of this dissertation will be limited to voluntary active 
euthanasia, i.e. where the patient requests that somebody else perform 
a positive act that will bring about his death. This will include an 
incompetent patient who makes this decision prior to becoming 
incompetent. Involuntary active euthanasia raises too many legal and 
ethical issues to be dealt with in a dissertation of this scope. 
5.2.1. Arguments for Active, Voluntary Euthanasia 
fa) The Self- Determination of Patients 
It is already an established principle in our law, as in many other 
jurisdictions, that competent patients must consent to any medical 
treatment. They also have the right to refuse any medical treatment 
even if such a refusal will shorten their lives. 53 
Where a competent person concludes a Living Will, stating that should 
he/she contract an incurable disease accompanied by unbearable pain 
and it is certain that he/she will die from that disease, then he/she will 
52 Oosthuizen et al, 121. 
53Jehovah's Witnesses refusing blood transfusions, which treatment is regarded as 
essential whenever considered. 
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like the physician to hasten their death. When this patient becomes 
sick, if he/she continuously restates his/her position, such a patient 
must be allowed to die in peace and dignity. Although in South Africa 
we do not have a Living Will statute yet, thousands of people, mostly 
members of the South African Living Will Society, have signed such a 
will. 54 The Living Will may serve as a persuasive expression of the 
patient's wishes where he/she is incompetent. 
More people could indeed benefit from relief that is already available to 
the middle and upper classes of society - illegally. A good doctor knows 
ways of hastening death that cannot be detected in most 
circumstances. The more fortunate people, who have established close 
and intimate relationships with their doctors have a sense that if 
necessary their own doctors 'will know what to do.' This helps to 
explain why the "political pressure is not stronger for a fairer and more 
open system in which the law acknowledges for everyone what 
influential people now expect for themselves. " 55 
For the incompetent patient, other jurisdictions recognise the durable 
power of attorney which enables persons to appoint an attorney to 
make health care decisions for the principal, should the latter become 
unable to give an informed consent. 56 
54 Strauss, The Right to Die and the Cruzan Judgement in the USA, 1992 SA 
Practice Management, 12. 
55 New York Review, March 271997, 41. 
56 In the United States all 50 states and the District of Columbia have general 
durable power of attorney statutes. 
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Usually with incompetent patients we are dealing with a decision to 
discontinue treatment or not to commence medical treatment at all. 
This phenomenon is widely supported today because somehow it is 
seen as allowing death to take place. This is what Veatch57 refers to as 
the ethics of killing and letting die. Joseph Fletcher, an ethicist at the 
University of Virginia School of Medicine, recognises that some 
moralists have "put great store by the distinction between 'direct' and 
'indirect' actions" and states what is apparently his own position : 
"To others this seems a cloudy and tenuous distinction. Either 
way the intention is the same, the same end is willed and sought. 
And the means used do not justify the end in one case if not the 
other, not are the means used anything that can be justified or 
'made sense of' except in relation to the gracious purpose in 
view." 
The pragmatist may indeed ask what difference it makes whether 
positive action is taken to cause death or a treatment is simply withheld 
so that death takes place. In either case the patient dies. Is it not 
philosophical obscurantism to dwell on the differences ?58 
In both active and passive euthanasia the result is the death of the 
patient whether was the intention of the doctor or not. 
57 Veatch, supra. 
58 Ibid. 
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(b) The Role of Medical Practitioners Faced with Dying Patients has 
Changed 
In an attempt to keep terminally ill patients alive, doctors prescribe 
dosages of painkillers that end up turning the patient into a morphine 
addict. These patients are often terminally sedated through intravenous 
drugs which induce a pharmacological coma during which the patient 
is given neither water nor nutrition and dies sooner than he otherwise 
would, but these patients actually do die in pain.59 
Studies tend to show that most medical practitioners would honour a 
request for death initiated by patients. Forty per cent of Michigan 
oncologists surveyed reported that patients had initiated requests for 
death, eighteen per cent said they had participated in assisting their 
patients and four per cent had injected the drugs themselves. 60 These 
numbers would probably be higher if doctors did not fear prosecution. 
These statistics are said to approach the rates at which doctors help 
patients die in Holland, where active euthanasia by physicians is indeed 
legal. 
If the Hippocratic oath is progressively interpreted - after all it is over 
2000 years old61 - as society and the medical profession that serves it 
changes it will be realised that nowadays the doctor's duty is not only 
59 Supra. 
60 The New York Review, March 27, 1997, 42. 
61 Strauss, 1988 (51) THRHR, 188. 
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to keep the patient alive at all costs, but to relieve pain and suffering, 
hence the use of anaesthetic in childbirth and operations. 62 However 
some medical practitioners argue that active euthanasia, if commonly 
practised will undermine the whole ethos of healing and the doctor's 
role as care giver. 
(c) Palliative Care Measures will be Improved 
Terminal sedation is widely accepted and is not subject to stringent 
regulations. Should active euthanasia be legalised, it will be subject to 
stringent regulations. Before a request is considered, it must be 
demonstrated that effective medical care including state-of-the-art pain 
management has been offered, but has failed. Doctors and patients 
eager to avoid expense have no incentive to begin a process that would 
focus attention on their palliative care practices. Medical ignorance and 
fear of liability inadequate hospital funding and the failure of insurers 
and health care programme to cover the cost of palliative care will then 
be addressed. Legislation requiring coverage will improve the situation. 
It is indeed the view of the Coalition of Hospice Professionals that 
'removing legal bars on active euthanasia will enhance the opportunity 
for advanced hospice care for all patients because regulation of active 
euthanasia would mandate that all palliative measures be exhausted as 
62Anaesthetics are also used in minor things, e g pulling out a tooth. 
32 
a condition precedent to active euthanasia. ' 63 
(d) Certainty in Diagnosis of Terminal Illness 
There is more certainty in medicine today than there was a decade ago. 
Nowadays the profession recognises its limitations and challenges. 
Where active euthanasia is concerned, at least two specialist doctors 
will have to agree on the diagnosis and prognosis. This will help 
minimise the degree of error. Besides, "to try to ignore our fallibility is 
unrealistic, while to insist on remembering it only in the context of the 
question of voluntary euthanasia is arbitrary. " 64 
(e) Morality 
"Whatever opinion may be taken on the general subject of suicide, 
it has long seem so some people that euthanasia, the merciful 
extinction of life, is morally permissible and indeed mandatory 
where it is performed upon a dying patient with his consent and 
is the only way of relieving his suffering .... a man is entitled to 
demand the release of death from hopeless and helpless pain and 
a physician who give this relief is entitle to moral and legal 
absolution for his acts. 
One of the earliest expressions of the opinion in England came 
from no less a Catholic than Sir Thomas More, who, in the second 
book of his Utopia, wrote that in his imaginary community 'when 
any is taken with a torturing and lingering pain, so that there is no 
hope either of cure or ease, the priests and magistrates come and 
63 Amicus brief by the Coalition of Hospice Professionals filed with the United States 
Supreme Court. 
64 Ibid, 187. 
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exhort them, that, since they are now unable to go on with the 
business of life, are become a burden to themselves and all about 
them, and they have really out lived themselves, they should no 
longer nourish such a written distemper, but choose rather to die 
since they can not live but in such misery.' 
Perhaps an opinion to the same effect, though not couched in the 
same forthright terms, can be seen in Francis Bacon's New 
Atlantis. 'I esteem it', he wrote, 'the office of a physician not 
only to restore the health but to mitigate pain and dolours; and 
not only when such mitigation may conduce a recovery, but when 
it may serve to make a fair and easy passage.' 
A hundred years later, the Reverend Charles Moore, in his 
monumental treatise designed to condemn suicide, conceded that 
'the most excusable cause seems to be an emaciated body; when 
a man labours under the tortures of an incurable disorder, and 
seem to live only to be a burden to himself and his friends. This 
was thought to be a sufficient apology for the action in ancient 
days and can only be combated in modern ones by the force and 
energy of that true religion, which both points out the duty and 
reward of implicity resignation'. 
This writer's opinion that euthanasia as a form of suicide can be 
condemned only according to a religious hope of immorality was 
supported by Hastings Rashdall, who approached the subject, like 
Charles Moore, as a Christian moralist. Rashdall wrote: 
'It does not seem possible to decide whether the continuance of 
moral discipline is worth the prolongation of an existence from 
which all else that gives value of life has departed without asking 
what are to be the fruits of this moral discipline, whether it is 
rational to hope for another state in which the character thus 
formed may have further opportunities of expressing itself in 
moral activity .... I may add that this is almost the only case 
(unless we include also the somewhat parallel question of 
infanticide) in which the answer to any detailed question of ethics 
can rationally be affected by the answer that is given to a purely 
theological proble~.' 
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If it is true that euthanasia can be condemned only according to 
a religious opinion, this should be sufficient at the present day to 
remove the prohibition from the criminal law. The prohibition 
imposed by a religious belief should not be applied by law to those 
who do not share the belief, where this is not required for the 
worldly welfare of society generally. But, further, the ancient 
opinion that religion requires resignation, that the more unpleasant 
of two alternatives has some intrinsic moral superiority, has lost 
nearly all its support. At the present day it seems self-evident to 
most of us that laughter is better than sorrow, oblivion better than 
the endurance of purposeless pain. " 65 
It is a matter that gives food for thought when one comes to consider 
that, had we been talking about animals instead of human beings, so far 
from there being anything blameworthy in a man's action in putting an 
end to its suffering, he would actually have been liable to punishment 
if he had not done so. 
If wholesale killing in war and the punitive killing of criminals are not 
'murder' surely a killing done with the patient's consent and for his 
benefit as an act of mercy can claim to be excluded from murder. 
Moreover medicine is continuously influencing nature. Sterilization, 
artificial insemination and birth control are everyday occurrences. 
Labuschagne quotes Fletcher, who states that : 
"are all medically discovered ways of fulfilling and protecting 
human values and hopes in spite of nature's failures and 
foolishness. Death control, like birth control, is a matter of human 
dignity" 66 
65Williams G, The sanctity of life and the criminal law, 277 - 278. 
66 Labuschagne supra. 
35 
5.2.2 Arguments Against Active, Voluntary Euthanasia 
(a) Patient is Incapable of making the Decision 
A patient in immense pain although fully conscious is not 'competent' 
to consent to an act aimed at hastening their death because he/she is 
in a vulnerable position where third parties - like doctors and nursing 
homes that need a free bed for the next patient and beneficiaries who 
stand to gain from the patient's death - might influence his decision. 
Who is going to watch over all these people and make sure that the 
ultimate decision made is that of the patient alone? It will not only be 
costly but impossible to watch over the medical profession and an issue 
of this importance cannot be left to the profession itself to regulate. 
(b) Active Euthanasia is Against the Role of the Physician 
It is often argued that the role of the physician is to preserve life. In the 
Hippocratic Oath, physicians pledge that they "will neither give a deadly 
drug to anybody if asked for it, nor ... make a suggestion to this 
effect." 
A physician-patient relationship is one based on trust, and a move to 
introduce active euthanasia would undermine this relationship. This is 
expressed by Capron67 : 
"I never want to have to wonder whether the physician coming 
into my hospital room is wearing the white coat (or the green 
67 A M Capron, "Legal and Ethical Problems in Decisions for Death" ,Medical 
Health Care, (1986), 14. 
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scrubs) of a healer, concerned only to relieve my pain and restore 
me to health, or the black hood of the executioner. Trust between 
patient and physician is simply too important and too fragile to be 
subjected to this unnecessary strain." 
(c) Palliative Care is the Best Option 
As early as 1973, Cecily Saunders, the medical director of St. 
Christopher's Hospice in England, claimed that 'pain and suffering can 
virtually always be controlled by the proper use of painkilling drugs and 
sleep-inducing medication. 68 Pain can be made tolerable through 
advanced and expensive palliative techniques. 
(d) The Slippery Slope Argument 
If we accept the killing of the terminally ill for human reasons, may that 
not lead to the killing of the severely retarded child, the antisocial 
personality, or the ethically unattractive? 
" ... Once a society agrees that at some stage life is no longer 
worth sustaining, patients could become suddenly vulnerable. 
While we would begin with competent patients making their own 
decisions, we would be led too easily, into the realm of 
. involuntary euthanasia - either manipulating people into asking for 
suicide or actually doing it to them without their permission 
because they have become too burdensome and costly. " 69 
Once this right is acknowledged for the terminally ill, how can it be 
limited? Why should it be denied to dying patients who are so feeble or 
68 Veatch, 94. 
69 Bhagaloo, 84. 
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paralysed that they cannot give consent for themselves? Or to patients 
who are not dying but face years of intolerable physical or emotional 
pain, or crippling paralysis and dependence? Even if it were extended 
this far, on what grounds would it be denied to anyone who had formed 
a desire to die or to a sixteen year old suffering from a severe case of 
unrequited love, for example ?70 
(c) The Religious and Moral Arguments 
Euthanasia entails one person murdering another and that is against the 
sixth commandment, "Though shalt not kill". Besides, pain and 
suffering of the human body should be endured as this has a purpose 
prescribed by God. 
By allowing active euthanasia, man is entering God's domain. God has 
a specified time and manner for each and everyone's' death and man 
should not interfere with this. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The law already accords all competent persons the constitutional right 
to make momentous personal decisions which involve fundamental 
religious or philosophical convictions about life's value for themselves. 
The Constitution recognises that individuals have a protected interest 
in making those grave judgements for themselves, free from the 
70 New York Review, March 27, 1997, at 41. 
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flows from the right of people to make their own decisions about 
matters "involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy. " 71 
Decisions about religious faith, political and moral allegiance, marriage, 
death and procreation pose controversial questions about how and why 
human life has value. In a free society, like ours, individuals must be 
allowed the freedom to make these decisions out of their own faith, 
conscience and convictions. 72 
71 Planned Parenthood v Casey 505 U S 833, 8511992 
72 Planned Parenthood v Casey, supra and West Virginia State Board of Education 
v Barnette, 319 US, 624, 542(1943): "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation it is that no official ... can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word 
or act their faith therein." 
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